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On day five of combat operations during Operation 
IRAQI FREEDOM, advances by coalition forces were nearly 
halted by a dust storm, initiated by the passage of a 
synoptically driven cold front.  This storm impacted ground 
and air operations across the entire Area of 
Responsibility, and delayed an impending ground attack on 
the Iraqi capital.  Military meteorologists were able to 
assist military planners in mitigating at least some of the 
effects of this storm.  This thesis examines the synoptic 
conditions leading to the severe dust storm, evaluates the 
numerical weather prediction model performance in 
predicting the event, and reviews metrics pertaining to the 
overall impacts on the Operation IRAQI FREEDOM combined air 
campaign.  In general, the numerical model guidance 
correctly predicted the location and onset of the dust 
storms on 25 March, 2003.  As a result of this forecast 
guidance, mission planners were able to front load Air 
Tasking Orders with extra sorties prior to the onset of the 
dust storm, and were able to make changes to planned 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. EARLY TIMELINE OF OPERATIONS 
0n 20 March, 2003, at 05:34 local time in Baghdad, 
Operation IRAQI FREEDOM commenced with a “decapitation 
attack” on leadership targets around the Iraqi capital 
(CNN.com 2004).  The attack was carried out by Tomahawk 
Land Attack Missiles (TLAM’s) fired from various ships 
operating in the North Arabian Gulf, as well as F-117’s and 
other coalition aircraft (Lee 2003).  By 15:57L on the same 
day, the ground war was under way as lead elements of the 
1st Marine Division (1 MARDIV) engaged and destroyed 2 
Iraqi armored personnel carriers south of the Iraq-Kuwait 
border (Pike 2004).  Less than an hour later, the 1 MARDIV 
was well inside the Iraqi border and en-route to Basra, a 
major city north of the critical port of Umm Qasr.  By late 
in the evening on 20 March, U.S. and British forces had 
captured the port and much of southeastern Iraq (Pike 
2004). 
The crushing air strikes and rapid advance of 
coalition ground forces continued for the next 4 days (21-
24 March), relatively unaffected by weather considerations.  
As of the 24th, coalition ground forces had pressed to 
within 100 miles of Baghdad, and more than 6000 sorties had 
been flown in the air campaign, with more than 1500 sorties 
coming on day 5 alone (Pike 2004).  The combined effect was 
a pace of combat operations so rapid as to be unprecedented 
in the annals of military history. 
1 
However, on 25 March, the environmental situation 
changed.  A severe dust storm blanketed most of the region, 
blackening the skies and dramatically slowing or halting 
altogether military operations.  This storm made it 
difficult for both land-based vehicles and helicopters to 
operate, and severely impacted naval air operations in the 
North Arabian Gulf (Pike 2004).  The blowing dust 
intensified on the 26th, with an even greater impact on the 
coalition air campaign, before beginning to clear on the 
27th (Pike 2004).  The effects of this storm, combined with 
an over-stretched supply line, resulted in a 5-day delay in 
the impending ground-attack on Baghdad (Grossman 2003).  
 
B. DUST STORM SIGNIFICANCE 
2 
In spite of the impact this storm had on operations in 
the early stages of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, there was 
actually ample warning of its severity.  This storm was 
relatively well forecast out to approximately 5 days 
(Revkin 2003).  Unlike the early 1990’s and Operation 
DESERT STORM, when storms of this type hit with little or 
no warning, military meteorologists this time were able to 
provide coalition commanders with enough information to 
enable them to tailor battle plans, and implement force 
protection measures to better exploit the weather 
conditions for battle.  Lt Col Thomas B. Frooninckx 
(pronounced FRAWNIX), the commander of the 28th Operational 
Weather Squadron, the Air Force organization responsible 
for forecasting for the Middle East, said, “It’s one thing 
to say there’s going to be a big storm, but another thing 
to say where and when it’s going to be sand or a 
thunderstorm or where there’ll be cloud cover and rain.  We 
hit this one pretty darn well” (Revkin 2003).  According to 
Revkin (2003), in many cases, the mission planners 
incorporated the forecast conditions by shifting aircraft 
weapons load-outs from laser-guided weapons to GPS-guided 
munitions, and by fitting surface guns with heat-detecting 




The objectives for this thesis are three-fold. First, 
this thesis will conduct a complete and thorough case study 
of the meteorological conditions that led to the dust 
storm.  The case study will include an analysis of upper 
air charts at the 500 and 300 millibar (mb) levels and low 
level charts at 850 mb and the surface.  The upper level 
analysis will track the synoptic trough that tracked 
southward from Europe, across the Eastern Mediterranean, 
and northeastward toward the Caspian Basin.  The lower 
level analysis will be used to asses the placement and 
timing of the surface cold front and the associated strong 
winds which lifted the dust.  These analyses will be 
compared to satellite imagery. 
Second, an evaluation of the numerical weather 
prediction (NWP) models which forecast this event will be 
conducted.  The models of comparison will be the National 
Centers for Environmental Prediction (NCEP) Global 
Forecasting System (GFS) Model, the Navy Operational Global 
Atmospheric Prediction System (NOGAPS) and Naval Research 
Laboratory’s Coupled Ocean/Atmosphere Mesoscale Prediction 
System (COAMPS).  Each model will be compared against its 
own analysis and surface observations at a few key 
locations to assess their performance in predicting the 
necessary conditions for the dust event. 
3 
Finally, an intensive review of mission metrics from 
Major Christopher Finta, USAF, (2004) of the 28th 
Operational Weather Squadron, and a case study done by 
Lieutenant Commander Jacob Hinz, USN (2004) will be 
conducted.  The impacts of this storm on combined air 
operations, as highlighted in their work, will show the 
important role forecasters played in the development of Air 






Dust events, such as the one described in this thesis, 
are common in Southwest Asia, particularly in the winter, 
spring, and summer.  They are typically associated with 
“shamal winds,” or seasonal northwesterly winds occurring 
throughout the region.  The name “shamal” comes from the 
Arabic word for “north” (FNMOC 2004).  These winds can 
generate tremendous amounts of atmospheric dust as they 
travel across the northern Arabian Peninsula, Iraq and 
Kuwait.  Shamal winds can be further defined in terms of 
the seasons in which they occur, namely summer and winter 
(Wilkerson 1991). 
1. Summer Shamal 
The summer shamal is also known locally as the “wind 
of 120 days” (Wilkerson 1991).  It occurs usually between 
May and July.  The synoptic pattern which creates these 
winds is a high surface pressure over northern Saudi 
Arabia, a low surface pressure over Afghanistan, and a 
thermal low/monsoon trough over southern Saudi Arabia 
(COMET 2003).  Figure 2.1 shows the circulations around the 
high to the west and the low to the east that combine to 
enhance the northwesterly winds along the Iraq/Iran border 
leading to the Northern Arabian Gulf (NAG).  When compared 
to the winter shamal, this wind event is more persistent 
and has greater vertical motion over a larger horizontal 
area, primarily as a result of the higher surface 
temperatures and stronger associated upper level convective 
currents (Higdon 2002).  These winds can carry dust from 
the surface to approximately 5000 feet, and wind strength 
5 
generally decreases after sunset, due to the radiative 





Figure 2.1. Typical synoptic pattern for summer shamals. 
(After: COMET, 2003) 
 
2. Winter Shamal 
6 
The winter shamal is a northwesterly wind driven by 
the passage of a strong synoptically forced cold front, as 
shown in Figure 2.2.  The dust storms which arise from 
winter shamals are also referred to as post-frontal dust 
storms (Wilkerson 1991).  This type of event generally 
contains the most wide-spread and hazardous weather 
associated with the region (COMET 2003).  Strong 
thunderstorms generally precede the front, accompanied by 
strong southerly winds, which initially lift the dust 
particles.  Winter shamal events generally come in two 
different types.  The first typically lasts a total of 24-
36 hours as a frontal system moves in and through the area 
rather quickly.  The second type occurs when the frontal 
system stalls over the Arabian Peninsula, and usually lasts 
about 3-5 days (Wilkerson 1991).  Both cases can result in 
greater than 50 knot surface winds and 10-13 foot seas far 
out in the Arabian Gulf (COMET 2003).  The deep vertical 
mixing occurring as the front passes through helps keep the 
dust kicked up by pre-frontal southerly winds suspended, 
while the northwesterly winds behind the front carry the 
aerosol particles across the entire region.  Dust storms of 
this type are generally more severe for the first 1-3 
frontal passages of the season (COMET 2003).  For the 
particular case being studied, the winter shamal is the 
most accurate description of the event.  Hence, for the 
rest of this thesis, the term “shamal” will generally refer 
to the winter shamal.  
 
 
Figure 2.2. Typical synoptic pattern for winter shamals.  
(After: COMET, 2003) 
 
7 
B. KEY ELEMENTS OF FORECASTING DUST STORMS IN SWA 
In forecasting dust storms for any given region, it is 
crucial to answer several important questions:  What is the 
distribution of dust particle sizes? What are the critical 
wind speeds for the given distribution of particle sizes?  
Factors such as topography and surface conditions play a 
crucial role in determining source regions. Once these 
factors are analyzed, the physical processes for the 
transport of dust can be evaluated. 
1. SWA Source Regions 
Southwest Asia is surrounded by relatively rugged 
topography, which in turn, lends itself to large source 
regions for dust.  The region is considered largely semi-
arid, even though it is bordered on the north by the 
Caspian and Black Seas, on the west by the Mediterranean 
and Red Seas, on the east and south by the Persian Gulf and 
Arabian Sea (Evans et. al. 2001).  The Taurus and Zagros 
mountains cut into the region through southern Turkey and 
western Iran.  For the Saudi Arabian region, the Jordanian 
and Syrian mountains lie to the northwest, the Al Hijaz and 
Asir ranges to the southwest, while the Hadramaunt 
Mountains lie to the southeast.  These mountain ranges 
effectively block precipitation from transiting extra-
tropical cyclones.  The lack of precipitation in the far 
inland regions of the Arabian Peninsula provide a suitably 
dry surface region comprised of sand, clay and fine silt, 
ideal for the formation of dust storms (Bartlett 2004). 
According to Bartlett (2004), the primary source regions 




• Region 1: the Fertile Crescent region between the 
Tigris and Euphrates river deltas and flood 
plains, 
 
• Region 2: the An Nafud desert, in northern Saudi 
Arabia, which is an extension of the high Syrian 
desert, 
 
• Region 3: the Ad Dhana desert in central-eastern 
Saudi Arabia, and 
 
• Region 4: the Rub al-Khali desert in the south 




Figure 2.3. SWA dust source region.  (Image: Israeli 
Science and Technology Directory 2004; Graphical overlays 
of source regions adapted from COMET 2003) 
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As Figure 2.3 shows, the Fertile Crescent is a source 
region comprised of alluvial fans and dry flood plains 
containing a mixture of clay particles, which have a 
typical size of less than 2 micrometers, and silt 
particles, which range in size between 2-50 micrometers. 
The other source regions are generally comprised of fine to 
medium sand, ranging in particle sizes from 50-1000 
micrometers, with only a few small areas of silt (COMET 
2003).  Once the composition of the source regions is 
known, it is possible to look at the physical processes by 
which the dust is transported through the atmosphere. 
2. Physical Processes of Dust Transport 
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The transport of dust can be described in three 
processes depending on particle size and wind strength.  
These processes are creep, saltation, and suspension, as 
shown in Figure 2.4.  Creep refers to a process by which 
particles slide or roll over the surface, generally without 
breaking contact with the surface. This process is favored 
by large particles or lower wind speeds and will not 
usually result in large-scale dust storms (COMET 2003).  
Saltation is a process by which the particles may get 
airborne for short distances before falling back to earth.  
Although the particles do not travel far from their source 
regions in this process, they can contribute to much larger 
scale dust transport by disrupting the surface at each 
impact, thus kicking up much finer particles which are then 
more susceptible to the third process, suspension.  
Suspension occurs when the particles are held aloft by the 
air currents and can result in the dust plume being carried 
far away from the source region if the lofted particles are 
small enough for the air currents to keep them airborne 
(COMET 2003).   
 
Figure 2.4. Dust transport processes. (From: Heidorn 
2003) 
 
Generally the wind speeds required to activate 
particle movement, and thus initiate the three processes 
summarized above will depend on the size of the particles.  
This relationship between particle size and wind speed was 
extensively studied by Clements et al (1963).  They found 
that as wind speeds increase, larger particles are 
transported and suspended more easily (Bartlett 2004).  In 
general, the critical threshold wind speeds for 
mobilization of particles are summarized in Table 2.1. 
 
Soil Type Wind Threshold
Fine to Medium Sand Dunes 10-15 mph (8.7- 13 kts)
Sandy Areas, Poorly developed desert 
pavement 20 mph (17.4 kts)
Fine Materials, Desert Flats 20-25 mph (17.4-21.7 kts)
Alluvial Fans, Crusted Salt Flats 30-35 mph (26.1-30.4 kts)
Well-Developed Desert Pavement 40 mph (36.8 kts)  
Table 2.1. Critical wind speeds for dust mobilization. 
(After: COMET, 2003) 
 
In addition to achieving a critical wind speed, the 
lofting of dust also requires turbulence in the boundary 
layer.  Wind shear aloft can create the necessary turbulent 
eddies that loft the dust particles from a thin layer near 
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the bottom of the boundary layer. As a general rule of 
thumb, surface winds of 15 knots require a wind at 1000 ft 
that is greater than 30 knots to create this turbulent 
mixing (COMET 2003).  Additionally, instability as a result 
of day-time heating further contributes to the favorable 
conditions for lofting dust. 
A convenient parameter for dust forecasting which 
accounts for the effects of wind speed, boundary layer 
turbulence, and low-level stability is friction velocity 
(u*).  It is defined in the American Meteorological 
Society’s Glossary of Meteorology (Glickman 2000) as a 
reference wind velocity that is the square root of the 
Reynolds stress (τ) divided by air density (ρ).   
u* = (|τ /  ρ | )1/2 
In simple terms, it represents the momentum flux into the 
surface by the mean wind.   
Following Westphal et al (1988), the friction velocity 
can also be defined (in cm/sec) as: 
u* = Vs κ /[ln(Zs/Zo) - ψm(Zs/L)] 
where: 
Vs = the wind speed at the mid-point(Zs ) of surface layer 
κ  = the Von Karmann constant 
Zo = the surface roughness (usually 0.01 for deserts) 
ψm = the stability parameter for momentum 
L = the Monin-Obukhov length. 
 
From the research of Westphal et al. (1988), it has been 
determined that on average a friction velocity of greater 
than 60 cm/s is required for the lifting of dust. 
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 Finally, the last key process of dust storms to look 
at is the dissipation process.  Eventually, dust is removed 
from the atmosphere by four processes: dispersion, 
advection, settling, and entrainment in precipitation.  
Dispersion is the process by which the dust plume fans out 
and becomes dilute as a result of the winds.  The speed 
with which this process occurs is mainly governed by the 
wind strength and turbulence, both mechanical and thermal. 
Atmospheric stability works counter to turbulent mixing to 
inhibit the dispersion of dust (COMET 2003).  Advection is 
simply the transport of dust out of the area by the winds.  
However, winds aloft can often differ in direction from 
surface winds; therefore it is not uncommon for dust in the 
upper regions of the plume to be advected in a different 
direction than in the near surface regions (COMET 2003). 
Settling of dust is governed by the dust particle 
size.  Typically, particles in the 10-50 micrometer size 
range tend to fall out of the atmosphere at approximately 
1000 feet per hour (COMET 2003).  The total amount of dust 
in the air, its particle size distribution, and the height 
of the dust determine the length of time for this process 
to clear the air.  For post-frontal dust storms, the 
process of settling normally will clear the air of dust 
within a few hours of the frontal passage.  Entrainment of 
dust in precipitation refers to the process by which the 
particles serve as condensation nuclei for cloud droplets. 
As the droplets activate, they grow in size to the point at 
which they fall out as precipitation, thus carrying the 




C. REGIONAL CLIMATOLOGY AND LITERATURE REVIEW   
The weather in Iraq from December to March generally 
consists of fair skies and reasonably temperate weather.  
However, migratory lows and troughs tend to pass through 
the region every 3-5 days, bringing with them short periods 
of precipitation and occasional dust storms (Franklin 
2004).  The large-scale dust storms associated with the 24-
36 hour winter shamals occur typically 2-3 times per month 
during December-March, and it is not uncommon to have the 
3-5 day shamals occur 1-3 times during the entire season 
(COMET 2003).  These storms appear to occur slightly more 
frequently during El Niño years (Franklin 2004). As a 
general rule, in spite of the almost continuous presence of 
dust haze during the winter, the overall visibility in 
between dust storms is better than during the summer. 
(Franklin 2004).  The strongest of the dust storms can 
result in visibilities dropping to zero meters in a matter 
of a few hours, as was the case in the storm being studied. 
The Fleet Numerical Meteorology and Oceanography 
Center (FNMOC) paper, “Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) 
Numerical Model Validation,” (FNMOC 2004) reviewed three 
different cases of 24-36 hour shamal events in February, 
March and April of 2003, including the event from 25-27 
March.  The paper broke down the case studies into 
objective and subjective analyses for the purpose of 
evaluating various numerical weather prediction model 
tendencies.  The prime focus was on the performance of 
NOGAPS and COAMPS relative to GFS.  This thesis will conduct 
a similar qualitative analysis, but for a more focused look 
at the specific case occurring in late March of 2003.  
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III. SYNOPTIC DUST STORM ANALYSIS 
A. METHODOLOGY  
In the analysis of this storm, it is important to 
first look 2 to 3 days ahead of the onset of blowing dust 
and analyze the synoptic situation leading up to the event.  
According to Perrone (1979), the initial indication of a 
synoptically forced shamal event is the presence of an 
“upper level trough with a corresponding surface low moving 
over Syria from the eastern Mediterranean.”  He describes a 
southerly flow ahead of the advancing cold front, which 
gradually increases in intensity with time, as the cold 
front approaches.  These winds activate dust particles in 
the source regions described above and commence the dust 
storm process.  The winds do not actually shift to a more 
northerly component until after the passage of the cold 
front.  With this conceptual model of a classical synoptic 
shamal in mind, the case study will step through the 
development of the storm by looking at numerical model 
analysis representing the “best-estimate” of the state of 
the atmosphere at the time. Also, the model analyses will 
be compared with satellite imagery.  The storm development 
analysis begins 22 March at 0000 GMT, and steps through the 
event in 12 hour increments until 27 March at 0000 GMT, 
when the system moves northeastward toward the Caspian 
basin. 
 
B. 22 MARCH 2003 
On 22 March, 2003, the synoptic pattern indicates the 
presence of the conditions described above, which Perrone 
(1979) calls the “pre-shamal period”.  At 0000 GMT, GFS 
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model analysis shows a 5-wave long-wave pattern in the 500 
mb height field with a closed low over the southern and 
central Ukraine (Figure 3.1).  An enlargement of the NOGAPS 
analysis 500 mb height field (Figure 3.2) agrees very well 
with the GFS analysis, and shows in finer detail a building 
ridge centered over the North Sea and a strong vorticity 
maximum along the trough axis extending from the Ukraine, 
across the Black Sea into northwestern Turkey.  The 300 mb 
height field (Figure 3.3) shows a closed upper-level low 
centered slightly northwest of the 500 mb trough axis with 
a relatively strong upper-level jet entering the upwind 
side of the trough, wrapping around the base, and 
indicating the upper-level trough will dig southwestward.  
A strong subtropical jet cuts across northern Africa and 
turns northward over southeastern Iraq.   
At 850 mb, the height field indicates a 1360 meter (m) 
closed low over the Sea of Azov, just south of the Ukraine, 
with a trough forming over central Turkey east of the 500 
mb and 300 mb troughs.  A region of tight thermal packing 
cuts across Turkey diagonally from the northeast to 
southwest, across the Aegean Sea, Greece, and eastern 
Italy, indicating the presence of a long stationary front, 
as shown by the magenta line in Figure 3.4, and significant 
cold air advection under the 500 mb trough. 
Moving to 1200 GMT, 22 March, there is little change 
in the overall system with the long-wave troughs remaining 
relatively stationary over the previous 12 hours.  The 
major exception is that the upper level jet entering the 
upwind side of the 300 mb trough intensifies, further 
aiding the trough in digging southwestward over northern 
Italy.  The jet on the downwind side of the trough, 
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separates from its upwind counterpart, and connects to the 
sub-tropical jet.  The net effect of all of this is seen in 
Figure 3.5, where the 500 mb pattern shows a secondary 
vorticity maximum forming in the western base of the 
trough, over the central Balkans.  At 850 mb, the trough 
forming over central Turkey becomes a 1440 m closed low 
just north of the Turkey/Syria border, and the stationary 




Figure 3.1. 500 mb Long wave Height Pattern (m): 0000 




Figure 3.2. 500 mb Height (m) & Absolute Vorticity (10-
5/sec): 0000 GMT, 22 March 2003. 
 
 
Figure 3.3. 300 mb Height (m) & Winds (kts): 0000 GMT,      
22 March 2003. 
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Figure 3.4. 850 mb Height (m) & Temperature (oC): 0000 





Figure 3.5. 500 mb Height (m) & Absolute Vorticity (10-
5/sec): 1200 GMT, 22 March 2003. 
 
Figure 3.6. 850 mb Height (m) & Temperature (oC):  1200 
GMT, 22 March 2003.  Magenta line represents a stationary 
front. 
 
C. 23 MARCH 2003 
By 0000 GMT on 23 March, the 500 mb ridge over the 
North Sea shifts eastward over the coast of Germany and the 
Baltic States, building to 5700 m.  Figure 3.7 shows this 
development along with the developing vorticity maximum in 
the southwestern side of the trough.  As the trough 
deepens, the elongated lobe of maximum vorticity along the 
trough axis in the previous time period, as shown in Figure 
3.5, wraps around the northern end of the closed low and 
becomes more concentrated (Figure 3.7). This development is 
assisted by the continual strengthening of the jet at 300 
mb, which creates a strong region of upper-level cyclonic 
shear in the trough axis (Figure 3.8).   
At 850 mb, there is now a long trough extending from 
northern Syria and Iraq, across Turkey, to the island of 
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Crete (Figure 3.9).  Cyclonic flow around this broad region 
of low pressure continues to advect cold air from the 
Aegean Sea around the western side, which begins to deform 
the stationary front as shown in Figure 3.9. 
By 1200 GMT, 23 March, the 500 mb trough begins to 
extend farther southward, with the central low pressure 
reaching the middle of the Black Sea at its southernmost 
end.  The 500 mb vorticity maximum, previously at the north 
end of the closed low, rotates down the upwind side of the 
trough, elongating again, joining up with the developing 
maximum in the southwest base of the trough as depicted in 




Figure 3.7. 500 mb Height (m) & Absolute Vorticity (10-5 




Figure 3.8. 300 mb Height (m) & Winds (kts): 0000 GMT,  
23 March 2003. 
 
 
 Cold Advection 
 
Warm Advection  
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Figure 3.9. 850 mb Height (m) & Temperature (oC):  0000 
GMT, 23 March 2003.  Magenta line shows the deformation of 
the stationary front by the cold and warm air advections 
around the elongated low pressure region. 
At 850 mb, the cyclonic flow around the broad region 
of low pressure continues to strengthen the cold air 
advection on the west side, leading to the beginning stages 
of a weak cold front extending from the southern coast of 
Turkey, and bending back across the central Mediterranean, 
south of the island of Crete.  Meanwhile on the 
northeastern side of the low pressure area, a weak warm 
front starts to form along the border between Iran and 
Azerbaijan (Figure 3.11).  Figure 3.12 shows the METEOSAT 
water vapor (WV) image from 1200 GMT, 23 March. This image 
verifies the position of the stationary front across Turkey 
shown in Figure 3.11, with a band of clouds diagonally 
bisecting the country in approximately the same location as 
the thermal gradient in the model analysis.   
Interestingly, Figure 3.12 also shows a high altitude 
cloud formation over the coast of Egypt and Libya.  The 
formation is due to a transiting short-wave disturbance 
related to the 1440 m closed low approaching the region in 
the southwest corner of Figure 3.11.  This disturbance will 
move eastward along the associated baroclinic zone 
extending over northern Libya and Egypt and help amplify 
the rapid cyclogenesis in the main low pressure feature 
over the next 24 hours.  As depicted in Figure 3.11, the 
flow around eastern side of the low in the southwest corner 
of the image meets up with the flow around the western edge 
of the main low, which strengthens the baroclinicity in the 





Figure 3.10. 500 mb Height (m) & Absolute Vorticity (10-5 
/sec): 1200 GMT, 23 March 2003. 
 
 
Figure 3.11. 850 mb Height (m) & Temperature (oC):  1200 
GMT, 23 March 2003.  Magenta line shows a relatively 
stationary frontal boundary with slight deformation on the 






Figure 3.12. METEOSAT Water Vapor Image: 1200 GMT, 23 
March 2003. (From: NERC Satellite Receiving Station, Dundee 
University, Scotland: http://www.sat.dundee.ac.uk/, 
courtesy of EUMETSAT: http://www.eumetsat.de/) 
 
 
D. 24 MARCH 2003 
By 0000 GMT, the 500 mb trough axis is now stretched 
across the Black Sea and southwestern Turkey, with the base 
reaching the northern Mediterranean (Figure 3.13).  The 
ridge over Europe continues its progression eastward 
maintaining a magnitude of approximately 5700 m.  The 300 
mb jet continues to contribute to the overall amplification 
of the system, with the northeastward branch of the sub-
tropical jet at the southeastern end of the trough 
intensifying to 120 knots.   
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At 850 mb, the large area of low pressure deepens to 
1420 m, with central low pressure centering over 
southern/central Turkey, just north of Cyprus, as shown in 
Figure 3.14.  The circulation around the low intensifies 
the warm air advection to the northeast and cold air 
advection over the Mediterranean, thus strengthening 
respectively the warm and cold fronts developing in those 
regions.  In particular, the cold front starts to advance 
eastward just west of Cyprus, before trailing off to the 
west across the southern Mediterranean.  The frontal 
movement to the east is aided by the merging short-wave 
over the coast of Egypt.   
This analysis again compares well with the METEOSAT IR 
image from 0000 GMT (Figure 3.15). Figure 3.15 once again 
shows the previously mentioned short-wave moving eastward 
along the zonally oriented cold front depicted in Figure 
3.14.  The cloud feature associated with this short-wave 
begins to join into the baroclinic leaf cloud structure  
 
 
Figure 3.13. 500 mb Height (m) & Absolute Vorticity (10-5 
/sec): 0000 GMT, 24 March 2003. 
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Figure 3.14. 850 mb Height (m) & Temperature (oC):     
0000 GMT, 24 March 2003.  Blue and red lines indicate cold 
and warm fronts respectively. 
 
 
Figure 3.15. METEOSAT IR: 0000 GMT. 24 March 2003.  
(From: NERC Satellite Receiving Station, Dundee University, 
Scotland: http://www.sat.dundee.ac.uk/, courtesy of 
EUMETSAT: http://www.eumetsat.de/) 
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extending from the eastern Mediterranean, across Israel and 
into southwestern Iraq.  This cloud formation gives a 
strong indication of a rapidly developing cyclone.   
The surface low pressure feature associated with the 
short-wave disturbance is shown in Figure 3.16.  At 0000 
GMT, 24 March, the center of this disturbance is located in 
southern/central Libya.  Over the next 24 hours, the short-
wave will sweep rapidly eastward into northwestern Saudi 
Arabia, just ahead of the cold front associated with the 
main low pressure system over Cyprus.  Figure 3.17 shows 
this development, which will lead to the overall 
strengthening of the pressure gradient ahead of the cold 
front.  The main result will be an increase in pre-frontal 
southerly winds, thereby amplifying the severity of the 
dust storm that will eventually strike the area of 
responsibility (AOR), encompassing Iraq, the Arabian 




Figure 3.16. Sea-Level Pressure (mb) & 1000 mb Winds 
(kts): 0000 GMT, 24 March 2003. 
 
Figure 3.17. Sea-Level Pressure (mb) & 1000 mb Winds 
(kts): 0000 GMT, 25 March 2003.  Magenta line represents an 
occluded front; blue and red lines represent cold and warm 
fronts respectively. 
 
In the mean time, by 1200 GMT, 24 March, the 500 mb 
vorticity maximum at the base of the trough intensifies 
significantly and strong frontogenesis continues to occur 
over the eastern Mediterranean.  The 300 mb jet strongly 
supports lower-level system development with the jet 
entering the upwind side of the highly meridional trough 
and the northeastward branch of the subtropical jet on the 
downwind side working together to intensify the region of 
upper-level cyclonic shear (Figure 3.18).   
At 850 mb, the low pressure center deepens further to 
1350 m, and shifts southward over the region just to the 
west of Cyprus as the short-wave has now fully merged with 
the main low pressure system.  As shown in Figure 3.19, the 
cold front continues to rotate cyclonically, and extend 
across eastern and central Egypt.   
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Figure 3.18. 300 mb Height (m) & Winds (kts): 1200 GMT, 
24 March 2003. 
 
 
L   
 
Figure 3.19. 850 mb Height (m), Temperature (oC) & Winds 
(kts): 1200 GMT, 24 March 2003.  Blue and red lines 
represent cold and warm fronts respectively. 
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Figure 3.20. METEOSAT IR Image: 1200 GMT. 24 March 2003. 
Blue and red lines represent cold and warm fronts 
respectively. (After: NERC Satellite Receiving Station, 
Dundee University, Scotland: http://www.sat.dundee.ac.uk/, 
courtesy of EUMETSAT, http://www.eumetsat.de/) 
 
This development once again compares extremely well to 
Figure 3.20, the 1200 GMT, 24 March METEOSAT IR image.  The 
previously mentioned baroclinic leaf rotates cyclonically 
to a more meridional orientation as the system develops.  
Figure 3.20 also shows the intense region of convective 
clouds in the warm sector of the developing cyclone.  This 
type of activity is common ahead of a synoptically forced 
shamal event.   
At this point, the short-wave feature has completely 
merged with the cyclone and is strengthening the southerly 
flow ahead of the cold front.  Also noteworthy in Figure 
3.19, the 850 mb southerly winds, intensified by the short-
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wave, are sweeping into Iraq across the Saudi Arabian 
border at an approximate average of 15-25 knots.  At that 
time, stations in the region, such as Kuwait International 
Airport, Camp Doha, Kuwait, and Prince Sultan Airbase 
report light southeasterly surface winds, and “CAVOK” 
(Ceiling and Visibility OK) conditions, with no significant 
weather (Finta 2004a). 
 
E. 25 MARCH 2003 
Over the next 12 hours, the intensifying cyclone 
remains mostly stationary, shifting eastward only slightly. 
By 0000 GMT on 25 March, the center of the system at 500 mb 
is located in the northeastern Mediterranean, just off the 
west coast of Cyprus.  The downwind side of the trough at 
500 mb shows a short-wave ridge building over Iraq and 
eastern Turkey, indicating further system amplification 
(Figure 3.21).  The 300 mb jet again continues to aid in 
cyclone development, while the center of the upper level 
trough slopes back to the west of Cyprus leading to a 
strong baroclinic zone in the upper levels (Figure 3.22). 
The 850 mb central low is at approximately 1320 m, and 
situated over the western coastline of Cyprus.  The system 
starts to show signs of an occluding process, with a triple 
point situated over northwestern Syria as displayed in 
Figures 3.17 and 3.23.  This analysis is again verified by 
the 24 March, 2330 GMT METSAT IR image (Figure 3.24) in the 
typical “comma” cloud formation blanketing the region. 
As shown in Figure 3.23, the southerly winds at 850 mb 
ahead of the cold front nearly double to an approximate 
average of 30-40 knots over the 12 hour period.  At the  
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Figure 3.21. 500 mb Height (m) & Absolute Vorticity    
(10-5 /sec): 0000 GMT, 25 March 2003. 
 
 
Figure 3.22. 300 mb Height (m) & Winds (kts): 0000 GMT, 




Figure 3.23. 850 mb Height (m), Temperature (oC) & Winds 
(kts): 0000 GMT, 25 March 2003.  Magenta line represents an 





Figure 3.24. METSAT IR Image: 2330 GMT, 24 March 2003.  
Magenta line represents an occluded front; blue and red 
lines represent cold and warm fronts respectively.  (After: 
Finta 2004a) 
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same time, the sea-level pressure chart (Figure 3.25) shows 
southerly surface winds south of the Iraq/Saudi Arabia 
border at an approximate average of 20 knots.  The 
difference in surface winds and 850 mb winds indicates 
strong boundary layer mixing. 
Once again Kuwait International Airport and Camp Doha, 
Kuwait report light southeasterly winds at 5 knots, and 
clear sky conditions.  Prince Sultan Airbase, near Riyadh 
in central Saudi Arabia notes an increase in surface winds 
to 16 knots but also no blowing dust as of 0000 GMT.  This 
situation changes at 0255 GMT when Prince Sultan AB first 
notes the presence of blowing dust in its hourly METAR 
report.  At that time, they report southeasterly winds at 
 
 
Figure 3.25. Sea-Level Pressure (mb) & Winds (kts):   
0000 GMT, 25 March 2003. 
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Figure 3.26. NOAA-17 RGB composite image: 0730 GMT, 25 
March 2003.  Yellow arrows point to activated dust source 
regions.  (From: National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration: http://www.osei.noaa.gov/Events/Iraq/2003/) 
 
17 knots, gusting to 21 knots, but no significant 
restrictions to visibility (Finta 2004a). 
The NOAA-17 polar orbiting satellite pass at 0730 GMT, 
25 March, clearly shows the surface winds activating the 
dust source regions in northern Saudi Arabia, as indicated 
by the yellow arrows in Figure 3.26.  With the 
intensification of the pre-frontal southerly winds, the 
dust storm, now casually referred to as the “Mother of All 
Fronts” (Finta 2004a), is under way.  
By 1200 GMT, 25 March, the 500 mb low center migrates 
into the southeastern Mediterranean, (Figure 3.27) with the 
downwind short-wave ridge building over eastern Turkey.  
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The jet on the upwind side of the 300 mb trough weakens to 
90 knots, but the sub-tropical jet continues to support the 
upper-level cyclonic rotation, as it wraps northeastward 
around the base (Figure 3.28).   
At 850 mb, the low center moves eastward into 
northwestern Syria, with the triple point also shifting 
into the northeastern corner of the country.  As shown in 
Figure 3.29, the cold front continues to rotate counter-
clockwise, and pushes into western Iraq.  Once again model 
analysis frontal positions verify well in the METSAT water 
vapor and METSAT IR images from 25 March, 1200 GMT (Figure 
3.30).   
At the surface, the winds vary in intensity from 
approximately 45 knots over the central An-Nafud desert, in 
northwestern Saudi Arabia to 15 knots along the coast of 
the Northern Arabian Gulf (Figure 3.31).  The intensity of 
the surface winds increases greatly close to the front, and 
drops off further ahead of the approaching front.  
Comparing the surface winds with the values for dust 
particle activation from Table 2.1, the surface winds over 
a wide spread area are clearly strong enough for the 
activation of dust and sand from the source regions in the 
area. 
At 1155 GMT, 25 March, observations at Prince Sultan 
AB report winds at 170 degrees and 25 knots, with gusts to 
33 knots.  A dust storm is also included in the report, 
which drops the visibility to 800 meters, or approximately  
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Figure 3.27. 500mb Height (m) & Absolute Vorticity (10-5 
/sec): 1200 GMT, 25 March 2003. 
 
 
Figure 3.28. 300 mb Height (m) & Winds (kts): 1200 GMT,  





Figure 3.29. 850 mb Height (m), Temperature (oC) & Winds 
(kts): 1200 GMT, 25 March 2003.  Magenta line represents an 




Figure 3.30. METSAT Water Vapor (left) & IR images 




Figure 3.31. Sea-Level Pressure (mb) & Winds (kts):   
1200 GMT, 25 March 2003. 
 
one-half statute mile.  At the same time, however, Kuwait 
International Airport only reports southeasterly winds at 9 
knots and light thunderstorm activity (Finta 2004a). 
 
F. 26 MARCH 2003 
From 1200 GMT on the 25th to 0000 GMT on the 26th, the 
500 mb low center shifts rapidly northeastward, crossing 
inland and centering over central Syria.  The 300 mb 
pattern shows little change other than shifting inland and 
aligning vertically with the 500 mb pattern.  The 850 mb 
low center deepens to 1280 m, but remains relatively 
stationary over northwestern Syria, just slightly to the 
northwest of the upper level low centers. This slight 
southeastward stacking of the system, shown in Figure 3.32, 
becomes the first indication of system decay.   
40 
 
Figure 3.32. 500 mb Height (m) (Solid Lines) & 850 mb 




Figure 3.33. 850 mb Height (m), Temperature (oC) & Winds 
(kts): 0000 GMT, 26 March 2003.  Magenta line represents an 




Figure 3.34. METSAT IR Image: 0000 GMT, 26 March 2003 
(From: Finta 2004a) 
 
 
Figure 3.35. METSAT Water Vapor Image: 0000 GMT, 26 March 
2003.  (From: Finta 2004a) 
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As shown in Figure 3.33, the cold front passes almost 
completely through Iraq, with only the eastern most portion 
of the country under the thermal ridge ahead of the front.  
Post-frontal winds at 850 mb shift to a west/southwest 
direction in the northern regions of Saudi Arabia, with 
wind speeds averaging approximately 40 knots.   
This analysis once again verifies very well in the 
0000 GMT METSAT IR imagery (Figure 3.34).  The lighter 
shade of gray in the post-frontal region across northern 
Saudi Arabia and central Iraq, shown in Figure 3.34 
indicates the strong presence of atmospheric dust, having 
been lifted from the surface and cooled, relative to the 
warmer dark gray/black regions in southern Saudi Arabia.  
Figure 3.35, the water vapor image from the same time, 
confirms this analysis, showing the post-frontal “dry 
tongue” stretching across the same region.   
The surface chart for 0000 GMT, 26 March (Figure 3.36) 
shows a large region of 15-20 knot westerly winds in 
northern Saudi Arabia, and southern Iraq.  When compared to 
the approximately 40 knot winds at 850 mb, continues to 
suggests the presence of significant boundary layer mixing, 
which contributes to the overall lofting and suspension of 
dust and sand in that region.   
At 0000 GMT, 26 March, Prince Sultan AB reports 
southwesterly winds at 12 knots gusting to 22 knots, with 
no mention of dust or restrictions to visibility.  At the 
same time, Kuwait International Airport reports 
southeasterly winds at 20 knots, with light blowing dust 
limiting visibility only to 7000 meters. 
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Figure 3.36. Sea-Level Pressure (mb) & Winds (kts):   
0000 GMT, 26 March 2003. 
 
 By 1200 GMT on the 26th, the 500 mb trough continues 
to march eastward into northern Iraq, and begins to fill 
in.  At 300 mb, the subtropical jet shows a sign of 
shifting to a more zonal flow pattern once again as it 
weakens to 90 knots.  The upper-level trough begins to lift 
out towards the Caspian basin northeast of the AOR (Figure 
3.37). 
During the 12 hour period prior to 1200 GMT, a 
secondary low at 850 mb forms over northern Iran, and the 
low that was previously the transiting cyclone shifts 
northeast and fills in to 1380 m (Figure 3.38). At that 
particular time, the cold front passes into the central 
Arabian Gulf and a ridge of relative high pressure, typical 
following a cold frontal passage, builds over most of Iraq.  
The southwesterly winds across northern Saudi Arabia begin 
to weaken once again, averaging approximately 30 knots.   
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Figure 3.37. 300 mb Height (m) & Winds (kts): 1200 GMT,  
26 March 2003. 
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Figure 3.38. 850 mb Height (m), Temperature (oC) & Winds 
(kts): 1200 GMT, 26 March 2003.  Orange zig-zag represents 
the low level ridging behind the cold front represented by 
the blue line. 
 
Figure 3.39. Sea-Level Pressure (mb) & Winds (kts):   
1200 GMT, 26 March 2003. 
 
At the surface, the winds sweep westerly across 
northern Saudi Arabia and into Iraq at an approximate 
average of 20 knots.  Figure 3.39 shows the relative high 
pressure system that builds over Kuwait in the wake of the 
passing cold front.  The winds at 850 mb are still strong 
enough to advect the airborne dust into central Iraq. 
However, the increase in surface winds, coupled with 
relatively strong winds at the 850 mb level lead to a 
decrease in boundary layer mixing.  This effect combined 
with the subsidence created by the high pressure in the 
front’s wake aid in the settling of dust south of the 
Iraq/Saudi Arabia border.   
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This analysis is confirmed in the 1200 GMT, 26 March 
METSAT IR image shown in Figure 3.40.  The image shows a 
large dark region of relatively warm temperatures south of 
the Iraq/Saudi Arabian border.  To the north, the lighter 
gray shaded region encompassing almost all of Iraq suggests 
the presence of a significant amount of atmospheric dust, 
still suspended in the atmosphere, obscuring most of the 
surface features.  Figure 3.40 also confirms the presence 
of the trough over the Iraq/Syria border, as shown in 
Figure 3.39, which is the remnant of the cyclone that is 
now lifting out of the AOR.  However, while the cyclone 
itself is lifting out of the region, the post-frontal dust 
storm is reaching its maximum intensity.   
Prince Sultan AB, located in the tail end of the comma 
cloud in Figure 3.40, reports northerly winds at 21 knots, 
gusting to 26 knots.  The visibility is reported as 100 
meters in heavy blowing dust.  Strong winds aloft in this 
region are able to carry the dust far out into the NAG.  
At Kuwait International Airport, the situation is a 
little different.  The winds there are reported as 
northwesterly at 14 knots.  The visibility is better at 800 
meters and the obscuring phenomenon is listed as haze, 
rather than dust (Finta 2004a).   
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Figure 3.40. METSAT IR Image: 1200 GMT, 26 March 2003.  
(From: Finta 2004a) 
G. 27 MARCH 2003 
By 0000 GMT on 27 March, the 500 mb trough finally 
lifts out to the Caspian basin.  The upper-level flow at 
300 mb returns to mostly zonal across the AOR, before 
turning northeastward over the Arabian Gulf (Figure 3.41).  
The 850 mb analysis field places the remnant low pressure 
system over the Caspian Sea, with a weak trough axis 
extending through northern Iran, Iraq, reaching to Israel 
(Figure 3.42).  The 0000 GMT METEOSAT IR image, shown in 
Figure 3.43, shows significant clearing behind the remnant 
of the cold front, which still extends across the central 
Arabian Gulf.   
As of 0000 GMT, Prince Sultan AB still reports 
northeasterly winds at 11 knots and dust, but the 
visibility has improved to 4000 meters.  Kuwait 
International Airport reports light winds and sky clear 





Figure 3.41. 300 mb Heights (m) & Winds (kts):0000 GMT, 
27 March 2003. 
 
Figure 3.42. 850 mb Heights (m) & Winds (kts): 0000 GMT, 
27 March 2003. 
 
 
Figure 3.43. METEOSAT IR Image: 0000 GMT, 27 March 2003.  
(From: Finta 2004, courtesy of EUMETSAT: 
http://www.eumetsat.de/) 
49 
On 27 March, conditions across the AOR continue to 
improve throughout the day.  The dust continues to advect 
out of the region or settle out of the air as the frontal 
system kicks out to the northeast of the Caspian Sea.  And 
with that, the “Mother of All Fronts” (Finta 2004a) is 
over. 
 
H. STORM SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
In summary, this particular case could be considered a 
textbook example of a well defined winter shamal event.  A 
large scale synoptic trough, develops over Turkey and the 
Black Sea on 22 March, 2003.  The trough deepens, and digs 
into the eastern Mediterranean, intensifying in the 
process.  Over the course of the next 5 days, it sweeps 
across the Southwest Asia AOR.  In its wake, it initiates a 
major dust storm that severely impacts the theater of 
operations in the critical fist days of Operation IRAQI 
FREEDOM.   
However, there is major difference in this case.  
Clearly the short-wave feature that works its way across 
the northern regions of Africa and ties in with the main 
surface low pressure system strengthens the overall effect 
of the system.  Without this additional disturbance, a dust 
storm would still likely develop in the other existing 
environmental conditions.  The short-wave disturbance 
however is an important component of the strong 
intensification of the storm observed in the AOR.  The 
models and satellite imagery performed well in capturing 
this feature.  In the next section, an overall analysis of 
model performance in providing forecasters with guidance 
will be conducted. 
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IV. MODEL PERFORMANCE 
A. IN-DEPTH LOOK AT THE FNMOC STUDY 
In conducting a study of model performance with 
respect to the forecasting of this particular dust event, 
it is appropriate to start with a summary of the work 
already accomplished by the FNMOC Model Verification team 
(FNMOC 2004). In March of 2004, FNMOC released the only 
comprehensive study found at the time of this writing that 
deals with shamal events in SWA for the period encompassing 
the time domain immediately prior to, during, and 
immediately following the commencement of Operation IRAQI 
FREEDOM.  For purposes of their case study, the FNMOC model 
validation team (FNMOC 2004) defines a shamal wind as a 
wind with a northerly component greater than 20 knots in 
magnitude. 
The FNMOC (2004) paper conducts a validation study of 
GFS, NOGAPS, and COAMPS for a time period from February to 
April of 2003.  During this period, three large scale 
shamal events passing through the region are recorded and 
used in the validation.  In general, the FNMOC study breaks 
the verification into objective and subjective analyses.  
The objective part applies quantitative biases and root 
means square (RMS) errors to score the overall model 
performance.  The subjective part is a qualitative analysis 
of the gridded model output fields to determine trends, 
errors, and tendencies (FNMOC 2004). 
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For the FNMOC (2004) study, the meteorological data 
for the entire period is analyzed to determine individual 
model tendencies relative to the model’s own analysis and 
observations.  12-hour forecast cycles are used, starting 
at the 0000 and 1200 GMT model runs.  The analysis fields 
represent the initial conditions of the atmosphere at the 
start of the following model run while the observations 
represent a benchmark of the true atmospheric state (FNMOC 
2004).   
The three shamal events studied in the paper are 20-25 
February 2003, 25-27 March 2003 and 02-08 April 2003.  In 
all cases, the three models identify strong post-frontal 
northwesterly winds that match the applied shamal criteria, 
i.e., 20 knots with a northerly component.  The objective 
verification is carried out by comparing the model forecast 
winds to surface observations from civilian airports, 
stations and surface ships, received by FNMOC every 6 hours 
(FNMOC 2004).  Quality screening of the data allows for the 
rejection of reports containing erroneous or unrealistic 
data.  Both NOGAPS and GFS are run at approximately 50 km 
grid-spacing, and the data is bilinearly interpolated to 
the station observation location to create a basis for 
comparison at the 12-hourly output forecast times (FNMOC 
2004).  According to FNMOC (2004), the COAMPS Southwest 
Asia regional model uses a nest-2 grid with 18 km 
resolution extending out to the 80 hour forecast, and a 
nest-3 grid with 6 km resolution carried out to 30 hours.  
COAMPS forecast winds are also interpolated to the 
observation points every 6 hours in the verification 
process (FNMOC 2004).  
1. Objective Verification 
The objective part of the FNMOC (2004) evaluation of 
model performance begins with a look at forecast-minus- 
analysis mean tendencies for NOGAPS in the Eurasian 
continent (20o-60o N, 0o-130o E).  Table 4.1, taken from the 
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FNMOC (2004) report, shows values for NOGAPS biases and RMS 
errors in the 500 and 1000 mb wind speeds, geopotential 
heights, and temperatures all averaged over the entire time 
domain.   
Their results reveal that the NOGAPS 500 mb wind 
speed, height and temperature biases are negative, as is 
the 1000 mb wind speed and temperature biases.  Only the 
1000 mb height bias is positive.  The wind speed biases 
hold relatively constant at all forecast lengths at both 
500 and 1000 mb, as does the 1000 mb height bias (FNMOC 
2004).  The 500 mb height bias and the temperature biases 
at both 500 and 1000 mb exhibit a slight increasing trend 
with forecast length (FNMOC 2004).  At both 500 and 1000 mb 
levels, all forecast fields exhibit RMS errors that 
generally increase approximately linearly with forecast 
length.  The slope of the linearity varies with the 




Table 4.1. NOGAPS forecast minus analysis differences 
for Eurasian continent. Data from 3 case studies between 1 
February, 2003 and 30 April, 2003. (From: FNMOC 2004). 
For comparison, COAMPS Southwest Asia bias and RMS 
errors relative to the model’s own analysis are tabulated 
in Table 4.2 (FNMOC 2004).  Like NOGAPS, the temperature 
biases at both 500 mb and close to the surface are 
negative. However, the COAMPS temperature bias at 48 hours 
is approximately two times greater in magnitude at 500 mb 
than NOGAPS.  FNMOC’s results also generally reveal that 
COAMPS tends to forecast low pressure systems too deep, but 
without necessarily translating that anomalous low into 
higher than observed wind speeds (FNMOC 2004).   
Table 4.2 shows that the COAMPS wind speed bias scores 
obtained by FNMOC (2004) are fairly small and vary in sign, 
depending on whether over land or sea.  RMS errors in wind 
speeds remain relatively constant with forecast length, 
independent of surface type.  The other forecast fields 
exhibit some degree of increase in RMS error with 
increasing forecast tau.  According to FNMOC (2004), the 
tendency for COAMPS to be too deep with mid-latitude  
 
 
Table 4.2. COAMPS Southwest Asia model forecast errors 




cyclones is well documented on their model characteristics 
and tendencies web page (https://www.fnmoc.navy.mil/). 
No tabulated data, similar to that of Tables 4.1 or 
4.2, of GFS performance relative to its own analyses is 
provided in the report.  However, FNMOC (2004) does verify 
GFS 10-meter wind speed forecasts against station 
observations to assess the GFS wind speed biases and 
compares them to NOGAPS.  This comparison is graphically 
illustrated in Figure 4.1, taken from the FNMOC (2004) 
report.  Over the entire 3 month period, the GFS wind speed 
forecast tends towards a bias of approximately 1.5 knots 
too fast at 12 hours, with a general slight increase in the 
bias out to 120 hours (FNMOC 2004).  By comparison, the 
NOGAPS tendency is for wind speeds approximately 0.5 knots 
too slow, with the bias remaining constant from tau-0 to 
tau-120 (FNMOC 2004). 
For additional comparison, the 10 meter wind speed 
bias for COAMPS at 18 km resolution, averaged over the 
entire period, is shown in Figure 4.2.  This figure, also 
from FNMOC (2004), shows a bias of approximately 1.5 knots 
too fast, remaining relatively constant throughout the time 
domain.  The saw-tooth pattern in Figure 4.2 can be 
attributed to systematic biases associated with the diurnal 
cycle (FNMOC 2004).  These biases tend to cancel each other 
out at 0000 and 1200 GMT and tend to be additive at 0600 
and 1800 GMT (FNMOC 2004).  Figure 4.3 shows the wind speed 
bias for the 6 km COAMPS data (FNMOC 2004).  This figure 
shows a similar saw-tooth pattern, but with an improved 
average wind speed bias of approximately 0.75 knots too 
fast. 
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When the shamal criteria are applied to the data, 
which limits the sample size to the three shamal events 
listed above, FNMOC (2004) finds that the biases increase 
in magnitude dramatically.  They state that NOGAPS tends to 
under-forecast winds by 14-16 knots and GFS under-forecasts 
them by 12-14 knots.  COAMPS exhibits the widest spread, 
under-forecasting winds by 12-18 knots (FNMOC 2004).  These 
results are shown graphically in Figures 4.4 and 4.5 and 
represent averaged values over all three shamal events. 
The tendency for slow wind speed forecasts during 
shamal events will be verified against METAR observations 
in the central Arabian Peninsula at 1200 GMT, 25 March in 
the subjective analysis of section C of this chapter.  In 
general, we shall see that the subjective analysis for the 
particular date chosen agrees well, at least qualitatively, 
with the assertions made by FNMOC.  The agreement is 
especially good near the cold frontal region of the passing 











Figure 4.1. NOGAPS and GFS wind speed biases averaged 
over period from 1 February, 2003 to 30 April, 2003.  




Figure 4.2. COAMPS 18 km wind speed biases averaged over 
period from 1 February, 2003 to 30 April, 2003.  (From: 
FNMOC 2004) 
 
Figure 4.3. COAMPS 6 km wind speed biases averaged over 




Figure 4.4. NOGAPS and GFS wind speed biases for data 




  (A) 
  (B) 
Figure 4.5. COAMPS wind speed biases for data limited to 
the 3 shamal cases studied. (A) 18 km resolution and (B) 6 




2. Subjective Case Study: 25-27 MARCH 2003 
For the 25-27 March, 2003 shamal event analyzed in 
this thesis, the FNMOC (2004) paper also performs a 
qualitative/subjective analysis of the numerical weather 
prediction model performance.  As a more detailed 
subjective analysis will follow in the next section, the 
results obtained by FNMOC will only be summarized here. 
The FNMOC (2004) verification is conducted by 
overlaying the forecast and analysis fields for 500 mb 
height, 1000 mb winds and METAR observations for the 1200 
GMT, 25 March 2003 verifying time of the forecast.  The 
verification is carried out to the 72-hour forecast for GFS 
and NOGAPS, and the 48-hour forecast for COAMPS. 
According to FNMOC (2004), GFS exhibits the best skill 
in placement of the 500 mb trough center, and subsequently 
provides the best guidance as to the onset of wind-induced 
dust and sand storms.  They also state that NOGAPS is fast, 
placing the 500 mb trough approximately 200 km to the 
southeast of the verifying position at 1200 GMT, 25 March 
2003 (FNMOC 2004).   
Their analysis also indicates wind speeds at 1000 mb 
vary from model to model.  GFS is stated to exhibit a 
tendency to over-forecast winds by 5 knots over large parts 
of the AOR at both 48 and 72 hours (FNMOC 2004).  They also 
find that NOGAPS is weak by approximately 5-10 knots over 
the same area at 72 hours.   
The COAMPS 24 and 48 hour forecasts for 1200 GMT, 25 
March 2003 are said to provide very good guidance to 
forecasters (FNMOC 2004).  FNMOC (2004) states that the 
intensity of the COAMPS 500 mb trough and 925 mb wind 
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strengths are well forecast out 48 hours.  They state that 
the model has a slightly fast displacement of the 500 mb 
trough, and 925 mb winds are slightly weak in northeastern 
Saudi Arabia/southern Iraq (FNMOC 2004).   
 
B. VERIFICATION OF 500 MB HEIGHT FIELD FORECASTS 
In studying the forecast details of the dust storm 
that hits the AOR on 25-27 March 2003, a qualitative look 
at the 500 mb trough reveals how the models performed in 
forecasting the upper level features.  For purposes of this 
case study, the forecast verification time is chosen to be 
1200 GMT, 25 March 2003.  This verification time represents 
well the approximate time that dust storms began or were 
already underway in much of the AOR, and it correlates with 
the verification time used in the FNMOC study.  
For purposes of comparing analysis differences, Figure 
4.6 shows the 500 mb analysis height field at the forecast 
verification time for NOGAPS (shown in light blue), GFS 
(shown in yellow), and COAMPS (shown in green).  Of note is 
the fact that all three models’ analyses qualitatively 
capture the same features.  All three show a 5340 m low 
center located approximately 100 km off the coast of Israel 
and Lebanon in the eastern Mediterranean Sea.  The main 
difference lies in the structure of the center of the low.  
Away from the center, however, the height gradients 
generally agree between the three models.  Because the 
model analysis fields generally agree with one another, 
each model can be compared to its own analysis, and in the 
process be qualitatively compared against the other two.  
NOGAPS is evaluated out to 84 hours, GFS out to 72 hours, 
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and COAMPS out to 48 hours, which represents the forecast 
limits of the data set used in this verification. 
 
 
Figure 4.6. 500 mb height analysis fields for GFS 
(yellow), NOGAPS (light blue), COAMPS (green): 1200 GMT, 25 
March 2003. 
 
1. NOGAPS 500 mb Verification 
Figures 4.7-4.11 show 500 mb forecasts (blue dashed 
lines) for the verification time overlaid on the NOGAPS 
analysis field (solid green lines).  This sequence of 
figures steps through the model forecasts from tau-84 to 
tau-36 in 12 hour increments.   
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Figure 4.7 shows that at 84 hours out, NOGAPS is 
relatively slow, placing the center of the low almost 300 
km to the northwest of the analysis field that verified.  
Although NOGAPS is slow, it does provide good overall 
guidance on the depth of the trough and associated height 
gradient.  At tau-72, this error decreases to approximately 
240 km northwest, and continues to decrease with each 
successive forecast until tau-36, when the error is 
qualitatively very small.  Figures 4.8-4.11 capture this 
gradual decrease in position error with time.   
That NOGAPS seems to be slow relative to the analysis 
is in direct contrast to the findings in the FNMOC paper.  
As previously stated, the FNMOC (2004) paper placed the 500 
mb trough at tau-72 approximately 200 km southeast of the 
verifying analysis.  This discrepancy is possibly the 
result of a misinterpreted chart.  It is possible that the 
analysis field and the forecast field were inadvertently 
confused for each other in the FNMOC paper.  Regardless, 
FNMOC’s own Figure 20 (FNMOC 2004) is virtually identical 
to Figure 4.8, which clearly shows the forecast field 
lagging the analysis field. 
 
 
Figure 4.7. NOGAPS 500 mb 84-hour forecast (blue dashed 
lines) relative to model analysis (solid green lines) for 




Figure 4.8. Same as Figure 4.7 for the NOGAPS 72-hour 
500 mb height forecast. 
 
 
Figure 4.9. Same as Figure 4.7 for the NOGAPS 60-hour 




Figure 4.10. Same as Figure 4.7 for the NOGAPS 48-hour 
500 mb height forecast. 
 
 
Figure 4.11. Same as Figure 4.7 for the NOGAPS 36-hour 
500 mb height forecast. 
 
2. GFS 500 mb Verification 
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Following the same type of verification procedures, 
the GFS 500 mb height forecast (blue dashed lines) is 
overlaid on its analysis fields (solid green lines) in 
Figures 4.12-4.14.  Once again, this sequence of figures 
steps the verification through the forecasts from tau-72 to 
tau-36 in 12-hour increments, with the exception that the 
data for tau-60 is missing.   
Figure 4.12 shows that at 72-hours, GFS has the best 
placement of the upper level low center, with respect to 
the analysis field.  The center is located approximately 
120 km west/southwest of the notional position of the 
verifying low center.  This result agrees well with the 
findings in the FNMOC (2004) study.  The main drawback to 
GFS at tau-72 is the fact that it does not depict the  
overall depth of the trough very precisely, particularly in 
the center.  The area of the forecast 5340 m low center is 
substantially smaller than the analysis, by a factor of 
approximately one sixth.  However, the height gradient on 
the upwind and downwind sides of the trough is generally 
very good as distance from the low center increases.   
Figures 4.13 and 4.14 show the forecast verifications 
for tau-48 and tau-36 respectively.  Theses figures clearly 
show that by the 48 hour forecast, the discrepancy between 
the forecast and the analysis low center is resolved, 
giving even better guidance to the forecaster. 
3. COAMPS 500 mb Verification 
The higher resolution COAMPS model verification is 
graphically depicted in Figures 4.15-4.17.  Using the same 
color conventions (forecast = blue dashed lines, analysis = 
green solid lines), the verification starts at the maximum 
forecast tau, in this case 48 hours, and steps through the 




Figure 4.12. GFS 500 mb 72-hour forecast (blue dashed 
lines) relative to model analysis (solid green lines) for 
1200 GMT, 25 March 2003. 
 
 
Figure 4.13. Same as Figure 4.12 for the GFS 48-hour 500 
mb height forecast. 
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Figure 4.14. Same as Figure 4.12 for the GFS 36-hour 500 
mb height forecast. 
 
 Figure 4.15 shows that the model at 48-hours has the 
center of the low pressure approximately 220 km to the 
east/northeast of the verifying analysis field location.  
The low pressure center also covers too broad a region, 
covering the entire eastern Mediterranean and large 
portions of Syria and southern Turkey,.  The trough itself 
is forecast approximately 60 m too deep.  The height 
gradient is well forecast, but shifted to the east 
slightly, due to the eastward displacement of the low 
center. 
For the 36-hour forecast, verified in Figure 4.16, 
COAMPS exhibits better placement of the low center, however 
the region of low pressure is still too broad.  Moving out 
from the center, the height field on the downwind side of 
the trough starts to match the analysis field much better.  
Over central Iraq, the forecast trough is approximately 40 
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m too deep, and the height gradient is once again well 
forecast. 
At tau-24, the model forecast is over-taking the 
analysis field, as graphically depicted in Figure 4.17.  
The low center is approximately 150 km southeast of the 
verifying analysis.  The downwind side of the trough once 
again starts to deepen relative to the analysis field.  The 
eastward displacement of the forecast trough center 
illustrates a slightly fast tendency that agrees with the 
verification done by FNMOC (2004).  However, COAMPS in 
general provides relatively good information to forecasters 
out to 48 hours. 
 
 
Figure 4.15. COAMPS 500 mb 48-hour forecast (blue dashed 
lines) relative to model analysis (solid green lines) for 






Figure 4.16. Same as Figure 4.15 for the COAMPS 36-hour 
500 mb height forecast. 
 
 
Figure 4.17. Same as Figure 4.15 for the COAMPS 24-hour 
500 mb height forecast. 
 
C. VERIFICATION OF THE SLP FIELD AND 1000 MB WINDS 
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In verifying the forecasts of the surface winds which 
produced the dust storm studied in this thesis, a similar 
approach is taken.  For each of the three models, the 
forecast sea-level pressure (SLP) field and 1000 mb winds 
are overlaid on the SLP analysis field and METAR 
observations for 1200 GMT, 25 March 2003.  Each model is 
compared against its own analysis, and the observations to 
determine its qualitative accuracy.  Once again, to 
establish a basis for comparison, Figure 4.18 shows the 
verifying SLP analysis field of each model overlaid with 
each other.  From Figure 4.18, it is easily seen that the 
models are generally in good agreement on the SLP field.  
All models capture a kidney bean-shaped pressure field, 
which is the result of the merger between the main low 
center to the north and the short-wave disturbance that 
transited northern Africa along the cold front of the main 
system.  The resultant system shows an approximate 992 mb 
low pressure center over western Iraq.  Moving away from 
the center, the pressure gradients for each model’s 
analysis field are also generally in agreement.  With this 
figure forming the foundation for the verification, it is 




Figure 4.18. SLP analysis field for GFS (yellow), NOGAPS 
(blue), and COAMPS (green): 1200 GMT, 25 March 2003. 
1. NOGAPS SLP Verification 
Similar to the 500 mb case study of the previous 
section, the verification of the NOGAPS SLP forecast begins 
at 84 hours and steps to 72 hours for comparison to the 
GFS.  Figure 4.19 shows the 84-hour NOGAPS forecast SLP 
field (shown in dashed yellow) and 1000 mb surface winds 
(shown in red barbs) overlaid on the verifying analysis 
(shown in blue) and hourly METAR reports (shown in green) 
for 1200 GMT, 25 March 2003.  Figure 4.20 shows the same 
information, but for the 72-hour forecast. 
From Figure 4.19, it is easily seen that the 84-hour 
forecast does not quite capture the 991 mb low center that 
verified over western Iraq in the analysis field.  The 
forecast is for a 999 mb low approximately 300 km to the 
south, with a secondary 998 mb low over Turkey.  While the 
forecast low pressure system is not as deep and does not 
have the same kidney bean shape, it does capture, at least 
qualitatively, the ridging over Lebanon, Jordan and Israel 
that verified in the wake of the frontal passage.   
The 1000 mb winds verify extremely well against the 
METAR observations for eastern Saudi Arabia.  Wind 
directions are generally in agreement and within 10-15 
degrees of the METAR observations.  Wind speeds are also in 
good agreement away from the southern low.  Over much of 
eastern Saudi Arabia, well ahead of the front, the forecast 
winds speeds are either exact or within 5 knots too fast.  
However, in northern Saudi Arabia near the western side of 
the southern low pressure center, the wind speeds lag the 
observations by approximately 5-10 knots.  This performance 




Figure 4.19. NOGAPS 84-hour forecast of SLP pressure 
(yellow dashed lines), 1000 mb winds (red barbs), analysis 
pressure field (blue solid lines), and METAR Observations 




Figure 4.20. Same as Figure 4.19 for the NOGAPS 72-hour 
SLP forecast. 
 
Comparing Figure 4.19 with Figure 4.20, the 72-hour 
forecast shows little change qualitatively in the overall 
pressure field, while maintaining a similar high quality 
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wind forecast.  Of interest to note in both Figures 4.19 
and 4.20, is the fact that in the frontal region near the 
southern low, which is known to cut across central/eastern 
Iraq and Saudi Arabia at this time, stations with wind 
speeds of 15 knots or greater are reporting some degree of 
blowing dust or sand in the verifying hourly METAR report. 
 
2. GFS SLP Verification 
Figure 4.21 shows a similar verifying analysis for the GFS 
72-hour forecast with color conventions similar to Figures 
4.19 and 4.20.  At 72 hours, GFS places the southern low 
pressure approximately 100 km east of the verifying 
position over central/western Iraq.  The forecast low, like 
NOGAPS, is also not as deep as the analysis field, with the 
low center reaching only 997 mb, vice the 991 mb low center 
in the analysis field.  Overall, the GFS forecast provides 
better guidance than NOGAPS on the shape of the low 
pressure system, relative to the model’s own analysis, but 
misses some of the details such as the post-frontal ridging 
over Lebanon, Jordan, and Israel, which is captured by 
NOGAPS. 
The 1000 mb wind directions vary far more than NOGAPS 
compared to the 1200 GMT hourly METAR for 25 March 2003, 
although the forecast does capture the correct quadrant.  
Wind speeds are generally forecast 5-10 knots too fast in 
northeastern Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, away from the frontal 
system, and approximately 20 knots too slow in 
north/central Saudi Arabia near and behind the southern low 




Figure 4.21. GFS 72-hour forecast of SLP pressure (yellow 
dashed lines), 1000 mb winds (red barbs), analysis pressure 
field (blue solid lines), and METAR Observations (green):  
1200 GMT, 25 March 2003. 
 
3. COAMPS SLP Verification 
Verification of the COAMPS SLP and 1000 mb wind 
forecasts is carried out for the 48-hour forecast and 
compared against the 24-hour forecast, as graphically 
depicted in Figures 4.22 and 4.23.  The color conventions 
used in these figures are once again similar to those used 
in the NOGAPS and GFS verifications. 
As shown in Figure 4.22, at tau-48, the COAMPS 
forecast SLP field is not as deep as the analysis field. 
The central low pressure is forecast to be 996 mb, compared 
to a 992 mb central pressure in the verifying analysis.  
The model also places the central low pressure system 
approximately 100 km to the east.  The pressure gradient on 
the eastern side of the low pressure center is not captured 
as well as the previous two models.  In fact, the gradient 
is weaker, which we shall soon see results in an under 
forecast 1000 mb wind field over northern Saudi Arabia and 
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eastern and central Iraq  At 48-hours out, COAMPS does 
perform better on the post-frontal ridging occurring over 
the western portion of the AOR when compared to the 72-hour 
forecast for GFS.  This result is not surprising given that 
it is a much higher resolution model (18 km vice 50 km), 
run much closer to the verifying time (48 hours vice 72 
hours). 
As previously stated, the 1000 mb wind field is 
generally under forecast in strength.  As graphically 
depicted in Figure 4.22, the winds in the northern and 
eastern Arabian Peninsula are on average 5-10 knots too 
slow.  In one particular case in northern Saudi Arabia, 
just south of the Iraq/Jordan border, the model under 
forecasts the wind speed by approximately by 35 knots, 
compared to the verifying METAR report.  In fairness to 
COAMPS, all of the models have at least some degree of 
difficulty with under forecasting the verifying wind speeds 
in this region.  It is possible, given the location of that 
particular wind speed aberration, that there are some 
terrain effects from the Jordanian, Syrian, and northern 
end of the Al Hijaz mountain ranges that are not well 
accounted for in the models.  If there is an error in 
accounting for these terrain effects, the resultant error 
in COAMPS would be greatest, given the higher resolution of 
the model.  NOGAPS and GFS, being global models probably 
smooth these errors out a bit more.  The weak wind 
strengths are also noted by FNMOC (2004). 
The 24-hour forecast, shown in Figure 4.23, clearly 
improves upon the forecast pressure field relative to the 
analysis.  The central low pressure is well forecast at 24-
hours, matching nearly identically to the analysis field.   
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Figure 4.22. COMPS 48-hour forecast of SLP pressure 
(yellow dashed lines), 1000 mb winds (red barbs), analysis 
pressure field (blue solid lines), and METAR Observations 








The pressure gradient on the eastern side of the low is 
much improved, which results in much better wind speed 
forecasts across most of the AOR.  In both the 24 and 48-
hour forecasts, COAMPS generally provided very good wind 
direction information, which would be expected with a 
higher resolution model. 
 
D. VERIFICATION CONCLUSIONS 
In general, all three models provide excellent 
guidance to forecasters as to the conditions leading to a 
strong dust event.  For timing of the synoptic scale 
cyclone, the GFS performs best, which explains why 28th 
Operational Weather Squadron forecasters almost exclusively 
choose it as their model of consistency in their forecast 
discussions for this event (Finta 2004). However, NOGAPS 
and COAMPS also perform very well in this particular case. 
The southern low pressure associated with the short-
wave disturbance that transited across north Africa along 
the cold front was generally forecast by all models to be 
about 5-10 mb too shallow, especially at longer forecast 
times.  Moving away from the low pressure center, however, 
the pressure gradient was generally well forecast in all 
models.  This presents a possible explanation for the 
under-forecast winds in and near the cold frontal region of 
the cyclone, and better forecasts far ahead of the front. 
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Given the composition of dust source regions in the 
AOR, an average surface wind speed of 13-15 knots over a 
wide area of the northern Arabian Peninsula should be 
enough to generate a large scale dust storm.  In all three 
models, these conditions are revealed and verified.  For 
NOGAPS, these conditions verify out to 84-hours, for GFS 
out to 72-hours.  Given their solid performance, with a 
data set encompassing a larger time domain, it is 
reasonable to estimate that they would verify well maybe 
out to as long as 120 hours.   
COAMPS, even with the slightly under forecast wind 
strengths, still gives good guidance out to 48 hours.  It 
also gives the forecasters a higher resolution look at the 
surface features close to the verifying time of the 
forecast.   
In any case, claims that this shamal event is well 
forecast far enough in advance to provide mission planners 
with critical information on blowing dust and restrictions 
to visibility, do seem to verify on the basis of this 
information.  The only drawback to these models performance 
is that they tend to under-forecast winds near the frontal 
boundary, which if not understood and accounted for by the 
forecaster, could lead to under-forecast intensities for 
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V. IMPACTS TO OPERATIONS 
A. BRIEF HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
Throughout the history of modern airpower, weather has 
proven to be a major influence on combat operations.  In 
his recently published book, Air Force historian Richard 
Davis (2003), in reviewing the Operation DESERT STORM air 
campaign, states that weather has “prevented or spoiled 
more combat operations than any other single factor.”  Even 
in this day of highly sophisticated numerical models, 
weather continues to be a major issue and the most 
uncontrollable element in mission planning (Brown 2003).  
The weather patterns in the Middle East and Southwest 
Asia are at times difficult to forecast, which can compound 
mission planning problems in currently one of the most 
important theaters of operations in the world.  According 
to Brown (2003), many war planners for Operation DESERT 
STORM may have been given a false sense of optimism 
regarding meteorological conditions in the region due to 
the prevailing favorable weather patterns in the long 
period of build up to the first Gulf War.   
Based upon regional climatology data for Southwest 
Asia available in 1990-1991, it was estimated that the 
ceilings and visibilities over Baghdad would be greater 
that 10,000 feet and 5 miles at least 60 percent of the 
time in January, and 70 percent of the time in February 
(Brown 2003).  This proved not to be the case, as ceilings 
and visibilities were considerably lower much more 
frequently than expected (Brown 2003).   
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As an example of how this impacted operations, Brown 
(2003) states that in the middle of February, 1991, which 
was arguably one of the worst weather periods during the 
first Gulf War air campaign, over 300 sorties in the 
Kuwaiti Theater of Operations were cancelled in a single 
day.  He also states that, based on statistics from the 
37th Tactical Fighter Wing, nearly 25 percent of all F-117 
strike missions were aborted due to bad weather in the 
early days of DESERT STORM.   
The decision to cancel scheduled sorties in Operation 
DESERT STORM was most often not safety of flight related.  
According to Grant (2004), the dust storms and clouds that 
frequented the AOR during the winter and spring of 1991 
interfered with infrared targeting pods that guide laser-
guided bombs to their targets.  As a result, only 
approximately 8.8 percent of munitions dropped in the first 
Gulf War were precision weapons (Brown 2003).   
At that time, mission planning personnel needed 
constant weather updates to decide whether to press on with 
scheduled sorties, cancel them, or change weapons 
allocations around for a different type of attack (Grant 
2004).  As a historical note, the Joint Direct Attack 
Munition (JDAM), which is a Global Positioning System 
(GPS)-guided bomb, was not available to DESERT STORM 
planners.  The JDAM was developed after the first Gulf War 
to address the short-comings of laser-guided weapons, 
particularly in low-optical visibility conditions that dust 
storms in Southwest Asia bring.   
82 
Brown (2003) suggests that once the ground war 
started, Lt Gen. Charles Horner, the Joint Forces Air 
Component Commander (JFACC) for DESERT STORM committed his 
air forces more aggressively to support troops on the 
ground in contact with the enemy, regardless of the weather 
conditions.  Brown (2003) quotes Lt Gen. Horner as saying, 
following the start of the ground campaign, “The weather 
considerations that were valid last week, are no longer 
valid. [There are] people’s lives depending on our ability 
to help them, if help is required over the battlefield, 
then it’s time to go to work.”   
Even after the ground combat operations commenced, 
prompting a decision to fly missions in less than optimal 
conditions, weather was still a crucial factor in 
determining how to mitigate collateral damage, ensure the 
survivability of air crews, and choose weapons load-outs to 
maximize the delivery of lethal combat power to the enemy.  
Air Force weather personnel employed during the first Gulf 
War still managed to help find gaps in cloud cover and 
optimized times to schedule strike packages, with the 
impressive results realized in the air campaign (Grant 
2004). 
Twelve years later, additional upgrades to weapon 
systems, and improved weaponry, such as the JDAM, have not 
mitigated the need for accurate weather information.  
Forecasting resources are still essential for mission 
planning operations (Grant 2004).  Weather data is now part 
and parcel of the operations tempo, with Combined Air 
Operations Center (CAOC) staff members being briefed twice 
a day on current and future conditions around the AOR 
(Grant 2004).  Five day forecasts are essential to keeping 
Air Tasking Order (ATO) planners informed on future 
conditions at major bases and key target areas (Grant 
2004).  This is a direct result of lessons learned in the 
first Gulf War. 
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Based on statistics provided by Maj. Christopher 
Finta, USAF (2004b), of the 28th Operational Weather 
Squadron and the work of Lt CDR Jacob Hinz, USN (2004), of 
the Naval Postgraduate School, we shall now look at some of 
the impacts of the Joint METOC forecasts on scheduling for 
the major storm period from 21 to 28 March 2003. 
 
B. 28TH OWS AFTER ACTION STATISTICS 
The statistics, as compiled by the 28th OWS, for 
Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) provided by Maj. Finta 
(2004b) detail some of the effects of weather on air 
operations for the time period from 19 March to 18 April, 
2003.  This time frame encompasses the shamal event 
described in this thesis, plus an additional storm which 
hit Iraq the first week of April, 2003.   
The data shown in Figure 5.1 (Finta 2004b) graphically 
depict the break down of Air Tasking Orders (ATOs) affected 
by weather.  According to Finta (2004b), during the time 
period from 19 March to 18 April, 31 daily ATOs were 
executed in the air campaign.  He states that over 75 
percent of these ATOs were adversely affected by weather. 
20 percent of the ATOs are described as having had “major” 
weather effects, implying over 6 percent of their sorties 
non-effective or cancelled (NE/CANX).  No precise 
definition of NE/CANX is given, but one can assume a non-
effective sortie as one in which the primary or secondary 
objectives were not met.  A cancelled sortie most probably 
implies that the cancellation occurred within 72-hours of 
ATO execution.  Finta (2004b)defines “modest” weather 
effects as ATOs with 1-5 percent of their sorties listed as 
NE/CANX.  
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In total, the OIF after action statistics (Finta 
2004b) list 1650 sorties as NE/CANX due to weather during 
this time period.  This number represents approximately 4 
percent of the roughly 40,000 sorties flown between 19 
March and 18 April, 2003 (Finta 2004b).   
Figure 5.2, also taken from Finta (2004b), breaks down 
by percentage those NE/CANX sorties by cause.  Of note is 
the fact that low ceilings and visibility account for 94 
percent of NE/CANX sorties, while thunderstorms and other 
weather hazards account for only 6 percent.  This result is 
not surprising given the intensity of the frequent dust 
storms in the region, which often drop visibilities to zero 
in a matter of hours.   
Figure 5.3 (Finta 2004b) shows the break down of the 
same 1650 NE/CANX sorties; this time by mission type.  
Assuming the preponderance of sortie losses came during the 
two dust storms, which we shall later see is a valid 
assumption, it is easy to see that the dust events had a 
profound impact across the full spectrum of air operations. 
From Figure 5.3, we see that the dust storms had 
approximately equal impacts on Close Air Support (CAS), 
Airlift and Strike operations.  They had much less impact 
on Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) 
missions, as well as other operations including Defensive 
Counter Air (DCA) and Electronic Attack (EA). 
According to Finta (2004b), in 95 percent of the cases 
involving weather-related NE/CANX missions, the forecast 
was accurate to at least 12 hours prior to ATO execution, 
and in some cases accurate at far greater taus.  As an 
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example of a forecast verifying at a longer tau, a post-
deployment report from the USS Kitty Hawk reported:  
25 MAR Some aircraft diverted to Bahrain upon 
return from missions due to onset of sandstorm 
and reduced visibility to less than 200 yards on 
ship.  Forecast from 4 days prior to event 
verified. (FNMOC 2004) 
 
By the time the 25-27 March storm had passed, the 
aircraft carriers Kitty Hawk, Abraham Lincoln, and 
Constellation had cancelled two complete take-off and 
landing cycles, which reduced their carrier air wings’ 




Figure 5.1. Breakdown of weather effects on Air Tasking 
Orders for period from 19 March to 18 April, 2003. 
Classifications are by percentage of scheduled sorties 
affected by weather.  Major weather effects implies ATO had 





Figure 5.2. Breakdown of weather related sortie losses 
by percentage of cause from 19 March to 18 April, 2003, by 




Figure 5.3. Breakdown of weather related sortie losses 
by percentage of mission type from 19 March to 18 April, 
2003, by mission type. (After: Finta 2004) 
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The statistics provided by Finta (2004b) point to some 
key conclusions about weather support for the 25-27 March 
shamal impacting the AOR.  These statistics also validate 
the assumption that the preponderance of the NE/CANX 
sorties came during the two dust events.   
First, a power-point slide show detailing the after 
action report (Finta 2004b) states that on 19 March there 
were 130 sorties cancelled for various weather reasons.  
Finta (2004b) asserts that none of these cancellations were 
a surprise to mission planners and CAOC staff.  No further 
explanation of this assertion is given, possibly for 
classified reasons.  In general, the weather was good 
during the first few days of the air campaign. 
Secondly, the report also states that as early as 21 
March, the Combined Forces Air Component Commander (CFACC) 
was mandating ATO changes on the basis of the 3-5 day 
forecasts (Finta 2004b).  Between 21 March and 23 March, no 
NE/CANX sorties due to weather were officially declared, 
but changes to the ATO continued to be driven by the 
outlook for 25 March (Finta 2004b).  By 24 March, with the 
storm system rapidly approaching as expected, the mission 
planners began calling for JDAM-only aircraft to be 
launched, in an effort to minimize the effects of the 
expected dust storm (Finta 2004b).  From the time the dust 
storm hit the AOR on 25 March until the time it lifted out 
of the region on 27 March, a total of 817 sorties were 
listed as NE/CANX due to weather (Finta 2004b).   
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In the period between the storms, from 28 March to 6 
April, far fewer sorties were affected by the weather.  
From the time the second storm hit on 7 April until its 
passing on 19 April, another 411 sorties were listed as 
NE/CANX due to weather (Finta 2004b).  The 1228 sorties 
lost due to weather during the two dust storms represent 
approximately 75 percent of the 1650 sorties lost during 
the entire 31 day period.  This validates the previous 
assumption that the preponderance of sortie losses due to 
weather came during the two dust events.   
The final point made by the after action report 
provided by Finta (2004b) is that during the study period, 
no sorties were cancelled needlessly on the basis of a 
forecast that predicted bad weather when good weather ended 
up verifying.  This differs from the findings of Hinz 
(2004). 
 
C. METOC IMPACT ON SCHEDULING (21-28 MARCH 2003) 
The study conducted by LCDR Jacob Hinz, USN, (2004) 
takes an in depth look at the impacts on scheduling of 
meteorology and oceanography (METOC) information provided 
to mission planners .  In his work, Hinz suggests that 
there is a direct indication that METOC forecasts played a 
direct role in influencing the scheduling of sorties, 
particularly in the 21-28 March time frame.   
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Hinz (2004) states that due to CAOC scheduling data 
that did not break out sorties by mission type, he operated 
under the assumption that three types of missions dominated 
the ATOs in the early phases of OIF.  In particular he 
states that due to the ground forces advancing along the 
southern front in the early stages of the war, he assumed 
that the dominant mission types would be Kill-Box 
Interdiction/Close Air Support (KI/CAS), High Altitude 
Reconnaissance (U2), and Laser-Guided Bomb strikes (LGB) 
(Hinz 2004). He reasons that KI/CAS would be used heavily 
to support friendly forces in contact with the enemy; LGB 
would be used to strike and surgically remove critical 
nodes, and U2 would be used to survey and assess the battle 
space (Hinz 2004).  Hinz (2004) further groups LGB and 
KI/CAS mission types on the basis of overall similarities 
in the missions and categorizes them under the term LGB.  
ATO planning for U2 and LGB missions can typically begin as 
far out as 5 days prior to mission execution.  With this 
fact in mind, Hinz begins his study by looking specifically 
at the time period from 21 March to 27 March.   
Figure 5.4, taken from Hinz (2004), shows in the upper 
panel the total number of sorties scheduled by day from 17 
March to 12 April 2003, and percentages of sorties 
cancelled (by cause) in the lower panel.  It should be 
noted that the source Hinz (2004) uses for the number of 
scheduled sorties is still classified, therefore the 
graphic in the upper panel of Figure 5.4 has the actual 
numbers of sorties removed.  However, this graphic can 
still be analyzed qualitatively to establish trends and 
relationships.   
Of note in Figure 5.4 is the dramatic rise in the 
number of sorties scheduled between 22 March and half-way 
through 24 March, followed by a dramatic decline in the 
number of sorties through noon on 25 March.  Hinz (2004) 
asserts, quite reasonably, that this dramatic rise is the 
result of mission planners hoping to strike as many targets 
as possible before the forecasted dust storm hit the 
region.  This assertion agrees well with the information 
provided by Finta (2004) that showed the CFACC dictating 
ATO changes on the basis of the forecasts between 22 March 
and 25 March.  Recall that Finta (2004b) stated that GPS-
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only weapons were scheduled to be dropped on 24 March.  
Furthermore, the drop off in scheduled sorties after noon 
on 24 March depicted in Figure 5.4 also lends credibility 
to the claim that mission planners believed forecasts that 
stated the frontal system would impact the area on or 
around 25 March. 
Further strengthening this argument is Figure 5.5 
(Hinz 2004), which shows the percent deviation from a 5-day 
running mean of scheduled sorties.  The period between 22 
March and 25 March is characterized by a strong positive 
deviation from the mean schedule.  The schedule was 
increased on 21 March and 24 March by as much as 20 percent 
and 10 percent, respectively.  Hinz (2004) once again 
asserts that this deviation from the mean coincides with 
forecasts of green conditions (i.e., forecasts of minimal 
METOC impacts on operations) as far out as 72 hours.   
The lower panel of Figure 5.4 (Hinz 2004) shows the 
numbers of cancelled sorties, by percentage, and the cause 
of the cancellation.  The greatest percentage of 
cancellations occurs in the time period from 25 March to 28 
March, with the vast majority of those being due to 
weather.    
Figure 5.5 (Hinz 2004) shows that the period from 25 
March to 28 March is characterized by as much as a 5 
percent decrease in scheduled sorties.  It would appear 
that the mission planners believed the forecast for the 
dust storm to hit on 25 March and decreased the schedule 
accordingly, but perhaps not enough to mitigate the 
resultant spike in sortie cancellations.  Hinz (2004) 
suggests that the increase in cancelled sorties could be  
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Figure 5.4. Upper panel: number of scheduled sorties; 




Figure 5.5. Percent schedule deviation from 5-day 
running mean. ( From:  Hinz 2004) 
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the result of overly optimistic forecasts indicating the 
storm would clear out of the area more quickly than 
actually verified.  Hinz (2004) also proposes that sorties 
were scheduled and flown despite accurate forecasts of 
major negative METOC impacts because of the need to support 
ground troops in contact with the enemy, thus leading to a 
spike in the number of NE/CANX sorties. 
The gradual rise in number of scheduled sorties after 
approximately noon on 25 March, graphically depicted in 
Figure 5.4, could also indicate a belief on the part of the 
mission planners that the conditions would gradually 
improve throughout the 26th and 27th, adding support to 
Hinz’s discussion of overly optimistic forecasts causing a 
spike in sortie cancellations.  This belief is loosely 
supported by anecdotal evidence uncovered by the author in 
the writing of this thesis that suggests the forecasters 
may have believed the frontal passage would occur on 24 
March instead of 25 March.  Once again, the decision to use 
only GPS-guided weaponry on 24 March, as stated by Finta 
(2004), could be used to suggest that the general consensus 
was for large scale dust storm generation as early as the 
24th.   
Without analyzing the actual forecasts given to the 
mission planners, it is difficult to say what the mission 
planners held as fact.  However, the preponderance of the 
model data examined in this thesis, suggests that the 
information available to forecasters should have enabled 
them to provide good information to the mission planning 
cell.  In the end, the air campaign was successful, and 
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
Southwest Asia is currently one of the most 
significant theaters of operations for the U.S. Military, 
and will conceivably remain so for the foreseeable future.  
The climate of the region is highly conducive to the 
production of severe dust storms, particularly on the 
synoptic scale, which can have a profound effect on 
military operations there.  The dust storms driven by 
transiting extra-tropical cyclones are especially intense.  
Such was the case with the storm that hit the AOR between 
25 and 27 March, 2003. 
At the outset of combat operations in Operation IRAQI 
FREEDOM, the coalition forces were achieving unprecedented 
rapid advances in territory, even compared to the first 
Gulf War.  On day five of the campaign, the advances came 
to a screeching halt within 100 miles of Baghdad.  A dust 
storm, initiated by the passage of a cold front that 
intensified with the merger of a passing short-wave trough 
from north Africa, brought visibilities down to almost zero 
within a matter of hours.  This storm impacted air 
operations across the entire AOR, including Naval Air 
operations far out into the Arabian Gulf.  It also delayed 
an impending ground attack on the Iraqi capital.  In spite 
of these effects, military meteorologists were able to 
assist military planners in mitigating at least some of the 
impact of this storm. 
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All three models examined in this thesis captured well 
the features of the upper level trough, as it dug south out 
of the Ukraine, across the Black Sea and Turkey, and 
tracked east across the AOR.  They also performed well in 
tracking the 850 mb low pressure system progression 
eastward, along with its merger with the short-wave 
disturbance which intensified the cold front. 
Metrics provided by Finta (2004b) and the work of Hinz 
(2004) further indicate that the METOC community performed 
well in providing useful forecasts on the March storm to 
the mission planners.  As a result of these forecasts, 
mission planners were able to front load ATOs with extra 
sorties prior to the onset of the dust storm.  
Additionally, they were able to make changes to planned 
weapons loads, favoring GPS-guided munitions.  These 
changes were made far enough in advance to maintain 
constant pressure on the enemy despite the severe dust 
storm. This ability to make rapid changes to mission plans, 
in response to changes in environmental predictions could 
arguably be a major factor in preventing any enemy counter-
strikes during storm periods in future conflicts. 
While the numerical models performed well in 
forecasting this particular event, other types of tactical 
decision aids are also aiding forecasters in predicting 
dust events.  Due to time constraints, the performance of 
the U.S. Air Force’s Dust Transport Application (DTA) and 
the U.S. Navy’s Navy Aerosol Analysis and Prediction System 
(NAAPS) was not evaluated.  A thorough case study of how 
these dust models perform in providing guidance as to this 
particular case would be useful in analyzing and predicting 
future storms, particularly in Southwest Asia. 
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Future work should also compare model output to actual 
forecasts, including the generation of forecasts based only 
on model output to assess the value added by human 
forecasters.  This work would be very important in 
assessing the most significant sources of error, as 
numerical models continue to improve. 
A continued emphasis on numerical model validation and 
improvement, coupled with further studies of metrics to 
track METOC impacts on operations scheduling will ensure 
that military planners in future conflicts will be able to 
exploit the weather conditions for battle, and ensure 
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